What's at stake in the 2023 Colombian local elections
The Colombian local elections will be held less than two months from now. A look at what’s at stake and a summary of the main races in the largest cities and departments.
In less than two months, on October 29, Colombians will elect their mayors, governors, municipal councils, departmental assemblies and local boards—over 20,500 offices and seats are on the line, with over 131,200 candidates. To learn more about the structure and details of local government, please read my special page about local government in Colombia.
Colombian local elections are a different beast from national elections: the issues are much more local, voters tend to vote primarily based on local considerations and candidates, turnout patterns are different from national elections, and parties and coalitions’ strategies and alignments differ from place to place (even within the same department!) and don’t necessarily reflect national politics.
For example, unlike in most countries, local elections in Colombia usually have the highest turnout of any elections: in 2019, turnout was 60.5%, compared to 48% in the 2022 congressional elections and 58.2% in the 2022 presidential runoff. As this old map (based on the 2006-2011 electoral cycles) shows, some regions, like the Caribbean coast, tend to vote more in local elections, while other regions have similar turnout in local and national elections.
Nevertheless, the local elections are an early test for the 2026 congressional and presidential elections. Local political machines and clans will be testing their strength, the early groundwork for the congressional elections. As last year’s congressional elections showed, having an ally or relative as mayor or governor in power can often be a huge boost to congressional candidates. Presidential hopefuls will be seeing how their candidates perform.
As the only election between national election cycles, local elections are often made out to be a sort of midterm test for the incumbent government. In 2019, President Iván Duque’s governing Centro Democrático (CD) performed poorly in the local elections, which were widely seen as a setback for the government. In general, though, local elections are still dominated by local issues and local candidates and political structures. That doesn’t the media from trying to read national trends out of the results, and the vote in the big cities and departments may be influenced to some extent by national politics.
With Gustavo Petro and the left in power, these elections are different from past local elections, and Petro’s unpopularity (with approval ratings in the low 30% range) and current political climate could mean that these elections are more ‘nationalized’ than previous ones.
The right-wing opposition is trying to make these elections a ‘referendum’ against Petro. Former vice president Germán Vargas Lleras, natural leader of Cambio Radical (CR), seeking to boost his political ambitions (after his 2018 debacle), has said that the elections should be a ‘mini-referendum’ against misgovernment. Former 2022 right-wing presidential candidate Federico ‘Fico’ Gutiérrez, now running for his old job as mayor of Medellín, wants the elections to send a clear message to the government.
The uribista CD is seeking to mobilize its base by gathering signatures for a consulta popular (referendum) against the government’s reforms. However, the CD remains weak at the local level and will not have candidates of its own in Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla.
Many of Petro’s presidential rivals from last year’s election are also running for office locally: Fico Gutiérrez is running for a second stint as mayor of Medellín and Rodolfo Hernández wants to be governor of Santander; presidential pre-candidates Carlos Amaya (Boyacá), Alex Char (Barranquilla) and Jorge Enrique Robledo (Bogotá) are also on ballots.
Petro’s Pacto Histórico became the largest group in Congress last year, winning strong results in several places, most notably Bogotá. The Pacto’s local strength will be put to the test in October, regardless of whether or not the elections end up being a referendum on the government. In 2019, the left’s results were poor. Following Petro’s victory last year, the Pacto was ambitious, dreaming of challenging the old political clans in regions where Petro had won, like the Caribbean. Today, they have much lower expectations and anticipating, at best, mediocre results.
The Pacto had major difficulties in defining its strategies and finding strong candidates, amidst infighting and internal disagreements. Gustavo Bolívar, the Pacto’s mayoral candidate in Bogotá, called the Pacto’s chaotic candidate selection processes a “resounding failure” and “total embarrassment.” In several major cities and departments, the Pacto did not register official candidates, instead looking to support other candidates, like Alfredo Varela in Atlántico. Among the major cities, Gustavo Bolívar is the Pacto’s only strong candidate, although even he is likely to lose.
In 2019, the Greens were among the major winners, winning in Bogotá, Cali, Manizales, Cúcuta and Villavicencio, among others. The unpopularity of their outgoing mayors, particularly scandal-ridden Jorge Iván Ospina in Cali and Claudia López in Bogotá, portends that they’re likely to be among the losers this year. Indeed, the Greens don’t even have mayoral candidates in Bogotá or Cali, and lack strong candidates in several other major cities. However, they do have a few strong gubernatorial hopefuls, like Carlos Amaya in Boyacá.
Whilst local issues predominate and differ, security is emerging as the main issue in many cities. According to official statistics, in the first seven months of 2023 there has been a 22% increase in robberies compared to the same period in 2022, as well as an 11% increase in residential burglaries, an 86% increase in kidnappings and a 26% increase in extortion. The increase in criminality predates the Petro administration, but security has become one of the government’s biggest weaknesses. Nearly all candidates have made security one of their top priorities, most promising various law-and-order policies. Some right-wing candidates, like Iván Duque’s former defence minister Diego Molano in Bogotá, are trying to imitate Salvadoran president Nayib Bukele, the new idol of the Colombian right ever since Bukele clashed with Petro on social media earlier this year. Molano, for example, has proposed building a ‘mega-jail’.
The uncontrolled proliferation of political parties, courtesy of the National Electoral Council (CNE), as well as numerous coalitions and ‘independent’ candidates, means that these elections will be the most dispersed elections in years—making it even harder to read anything into the results.
There are now 36 legally recognized political parties in Colombia (35 when the candidate registration period closed), compared to 16 in 2019. All of these parties may endorse candidates for any office, anywhere, or form coalitions with other parties. In addition, ‘independent’ candidates, whether they’re genuinely independent or not, can register their candidacies by collecting signatures as a grupo significativo de ciudadanos (GSC), with the required number of signatures to obtain ballot access being low. Around 500 GSCs had presented signatures as of mid-July, a number similar to 2019 (and higher than 2015 or 2011), many of them from candidates trying to ‘pose’ as independents in spite of their partisan ties.
Coalitions and ‘co-endorsements’ (coavales) have also become more common—in 2019, over 500 municipalities had mayors elected with coalitions. The strongest candidates can be backed by large, ideologically disparate coalitions, as everyone wants to secure a seat at the table after the election. For example, Jorge Rey’s gubernatorial candidacy in Cundinamarca is endorsed by eleven other parties in addition to his own.
The current outlook
The elections look different in each city and department. In some places, the winners are obvious and the elections are uncompetitive. In other places, the race is wide open and undefined, and likely to be decided in the final moments, with surprises guaranteed. As of today, here’s a brief look at where things stand in the major cities and departments. I hope to be able to write more in-depth posts for these cities and departments before the elections.
Bogotá and Cundinamarca
As always, the national media is disproportionately focused on Bogotá. Incumbent mayor Claudia López leaves office with poor approval ratings (around 35%) and with her party, the Greens, not having their own candidate. The election in the capital this year is different because, for the first time, a runoff will be held if no candidate wins over 40% with a 10% margin over second—if this rule had been in place in previous elections, the last three elections would have gone to a runoff.
There are nine candidates (and all are men), with three leading the pack and another three or four lagging a bit further behind. Carlos Fernando Galán, who finished second behind Claudia López four years ago, is running again and is one of the favourites, as a centrist candidate promising continuity or stability on some major projects (the Bogotá metro).
On the left, the Pacto’s candidate is former senator and telenovela screenwriter Gustavo Bolívar, a petrista loyalist. While Bolívar is one of petrismo’s strongest candidates in the elections (that’s not saying much), and can still count on a high floor of support, his dogmatic reputation and various other controversies means that he will have major difficulties making alliances with others and would lose (quite badly) to any other major candidate in the runoff. Hence why his stated (unrealistic) goal is to win in the first round.
On the centre-right, Juan Daniel Oviedo, director of the statistical agency (DANE) under Iván Duque, is running as an independent candidate. He is counting on his good reputation as a competent technocrat and academic and seeking to avoid being associated with uribismo, which has never won a mayoral election in the capital. Another Duque administration official, former defence minister Diego Molano, is running to the right, focusing on security, and lags further behind.
Former senator Rodrigo Lara is trying to join the frontrunners as a centrist liberal. Former senator Jorge Enrique Robledo (Dignidad y Compromiso) and the former police director (2020-2022) General (ret.) Jorge Luis Vargas (CR) close out the field, with their candidacies primarily to ensure that their parties have visibility and to increase their bargaining power for the second round.
In the department of Cundinamarca, the governor’s race will basically be a rematch of 2015. Former governor (2016-2019) Jorge Rey is the clear favourite, backed by a mega-coalition of 12 parties. One of the department’s most powerful political bosses, Rey is a controversial figure who has been accused of being part of a “land flipping cartel” (changing land use designations to increase its value and favour third parties) as well as allegedly interfering with justice to avoid being investigated. Like in 2015, his main rival will be Duque’s former interior minister (2018-2020) and former senator Nancy Gutiérrez (CD). Other candidates include former representative Alfredo Molina, former departmental comptroller Ricardo López and the Pacto’s candidate Yorly Liliana García.
Medellín and Antioquia
In the capital of Antioquia, incumbent mayor Daniel Quintero (Independientes) leaves office with low approval ratings (around 30%), replete with controversies and several corruption allegations. Quintero has been petrismo’s strongest ally in conservative Medellín and Antioquia, and is seeking to build a national base for a 2026 presidential candidacy.
The undisputed favourite is Fico Gutiérrez, the right’s 2022 presidential candidate and former mayor of Medellín (2016-2019). Fico, who left office with approval ratings over 80% and remains very popular in the city, will campaign on a fertile mix of anti-petrismo and anti-quinterismo. Despite Fico being all but assured an easy victory at this point, there are 15 other candidates behind him—perhaps in a battle for second. Quintero’s candidate, a very distant second in some polls, is Juan Carlos Upegui, the cousin of Quintero’s powerful wife Diana Osorio and his former secretary of non-violence.
Other candidates include former senator Liliana Rendón, former caretaker mayor Juan Camilo Restrepo, left-leaning political commentator and academic Gilberto Tobón and renegade ex-uribista councillor Albert Corredor (now close to quinterismo), among many others.
The gubernatorial election in Antioquia is still wide open, with several strong candidates. The early favourite, by virtue of name recognition and experience, is former governor (2016-2019) Luis Pérez, who left office with high approval ratings. Pérez, a career politician with no shortage of controversies and old scandals, was a presidential pre-candidate last year but dropped out to support Petro. The right/centre-right is divided between Luis Fernando Suárez (the candidate of outgoing governor Aníbal Gaviria), former Liberal senator Eugenio Prieto, the former Conservative president of the Senate Juan Diego Gómez, uribista candidate Andrés Rendón and Donald Trump fan Mauricio Tobón (running as a right-wing ‘federalist’ with the slogan ‘Make Antioquia Great Again’). On the left, Quintero’s candidate is Esteban Restrepo, the mayor’s former secretary of government, who has received the support of the Pacto. The Pacto snubbed another local petrista ally, former Liberal senator Julián Bedoya, who jumped in at the last minute with the support of the new Partido Demócrata after the Liberals denied him the nomination because of a feud with party leader César Gaviria.
Cali and Valle del Cauca
Cali’s incumbent mayor Jorge Iván Ospina is the most unpopular big city mayor in the country, with approval ratings now under 20% amidst several corruption scandals and a perception that the city is in ‘crisis’, primarily because of high criminality.
The race is competitive, although the favourite for the time being is former senator and populist lottery businessman Roberto ‘El Chontico’ Ortiz, who finished second in the last two elections (2015 and 2019), now trying to ensure that his current frontrunner status endures until October 29. Behind him is Alejandro Eder, scion of a family of wealthy sugar cane industrialists, supported by much of the city’s business elite as well as the Conservatives and CR. A bit behind, former city councillor Diana Rojas is trying to fight her way into the top ranks, claiming to be independent and without political ties, although she’s supported by former mayor Maurice Armitage (2016-2019). Other candidates include Ospina’s former health secretary Miyerlandi Torres (the niece of Dilian Francisca Toro), Duque’s former justice minister Wilson Ruiz and petrista candidate Danis Rentería (controversial within the Pacto where he’s seen as a ‘Trojan horse’ because he ran for the Christian evangelical party Colombia Justa Libres in 2019).
The gubernatorial election in the Valle has a clear runaway favourite: former governor (2016-2019) Dilian Francisca Toro, the ‘baroness of the Valle’, head of the strongest political machine in the department and co-endorsed by six parties on top of her Partido de la U. After her first term, her old ally Clara Luz Roldán was elected governor in 2019. While Dilian is the shoe-in, she’s never been hegemonic in the department, but her rivals are divided. A strong outsider is Tulio Gómez, a businessman and main shareholder of the América de Cali football club. The right-wing candidate is Santiago Castro, while the Pacto’s candidate is former Yumbo mayor Ferney Lozano. Two-time gubernatorial candidate and former diplomat Óscar Gamboa is also in the running, supported by Robledo and Sergio Fajardo’s party Dignidad y Compromiso.
Barranquilla and Atlántico
In Barranquilla, the Char clan remains hegemonic. Former mayor Alex Char is running for a third term as mayor (after 2008-2011 and 2016-2019) and is certain of victory, which will mean that charismo has controlled Barranquilla for five consecutive administrations, since 2007. Charismo remains one of the strongest political clans in the country. Despite some loses in 2022 and the negative national exposure from Char’s half-hearted presidential candidacy last year, charismo reigns hegemonic without any real opposition in Barranquilla. Char left office after his second term in 2019 with a mind-boggling approval rating of 95%, and while his successor, Jaime Pumarejo, hasn’t been as popular as him, he still has an approval rating around 60%. Polls predict another North Korean-style coronation for Char: he could win over 80-85% of the vote, against the same token, hopeless opposition as in the past.
After Petro’s landslide victory in Barranquilla in 2022, the Pacto started dreaming of challenging charismo on their own turf. Infighting, the lack of strong candidates and the Nicolás Petro scandal means that the left is, again, weak and divided (four candidates). Their strongest name is Antonio Bohórquez, who finished a distant second four years ago.
The gubernatorial race in Atlántico is expected to be tighter. Unlike in 2019, charismo won’t ‘put’ its own candidate, but is expected to support former Liberal governor (2016-2019) Eduardo Verano, a charista ally who has a political career of his own (although Char hasn’t yet formally endorsed him). In a rematch of 2015, Verano’s main rival is Alfredo Varela (Greens). Varela also has the backing of some traditional political clans (though most are with Verano) and is expected to receive the Pacto’s support as well. Here again, the Pacto had big ambitions, but infighting and the Nicolás Petro’s scandal brought down Nicolás’ candidate Máximo Noriega, who was implicated in the scandal. Noriega’s wife, Claudia Patiño, is running, with the endorsement of Fuerza Ciudadana, Magdalena governor Carlos Caicedo’s party.
Bucaramanga and Santander
Bucaramanga’s mayor, Juan Carlos Cárdenas, leaves with low approval ratings (below 30%) and 16 candidates competing to succeed him.
The early frontrunner, by virtue of name recognition, is Jaime Beltrán (Colombia Justa Libres), an evangelical pastor and local councillor who finished second four years ago. Rodolfo Hernández’s candidate is Consuelo Ordóñez, who had been a staunch critic of his mayoral administration. Former Liberal senator Horacio José Serpa, who had until now lived his entire political career in Bogotá, is seeking to inherit the base of his late father, Horacio Serpa, a three-time presidential candidate and former senator and governor of Santander (2008-2011). Other candidates include Green candidate Carlos Felipe Parra (close to senator Angélica Lozano), Carlos Sotomonte (close to Cárdenas) and Diego Tamayo (endorsed by uribismo).
The favourite in the gubernatorial contest is Rodolfo Hernández. Rodolfo’s aura is considerably damaged after his bizarre 2022 runoff campaign, resigning from the Senate within months to run for governor and for failing to be a strong opponent to Petro. His candidacy may also be in limbo because of a potential ineligibility for disciplinary sanctions against him and a corruption scandal. Yet, Rodolfo is still a political phenomenon in Santander. The traditional political clans are divided between the former mayor of Floridablanca Héctor Mantilla (supported by the Partido de la U as well as the much weakened corrupt Aguilar clan) and retired Major General Juvenal Díaz Mateus (supported by five parties including the CD, Liberals, Conservatives and CR). Juvenal Díaz Mateus was one of the senior commanders ‘purged’ from the army after Petro’s inauguration last year, and is campaigning as a conservative anti-petrista ‘outsider’ and accusing Rodolfo of ‘betraying’ his voters—but he has wide support from traditional clans, which includes his own family. Luis Ferley Sierra is the Green candidate. Petrismo has a weak token candidate, but in practice is understood to be implicitly supporting Rodolfo Hernández, through an informal deal with Carlos Ramón González, the former co-president of the Greens and now secretary general of the presidency.
Cartagena and Bolívar
Four years ago, William Dau won a big upset victory in Cartagena with his anti-corruption rhetoric and attacks on the traditional political clans that have historically controlled local politics. The popular tourist destination has been plagued by years of misgovernment, political instability and corruption. Today, Dau is unpopular, seen as ineffective and incompetent.
The traditional political clans and caciques have learned their lesson from 2019 and are choosing to lie low this year. Two old ‘traditional’ clientelist politicians, former governor (2016-2019) Dumek Turbay and 2019 mayoral runner-up William García Tirado, are both posing as ‘independents’. Their main challenger is former mayor (2008-2011) Judith Pinedo ‘La Mariamulata’, whose victory in 2007 was the first big upset to the power of the ruling clans and who then persecuted her for years on trumped-up charges. After being wrongfully convicted and incarcerated for two years, she was finally acquitted in March 2023, resuscitating her political career. Her rivals have attacked her for being implicitly supported by Dau. The Pacto’s candidate is councillor Javier Julio Bejarano, but here too the left has been hurt by infighting and divisions—the Pacto wasn’t even able to put together a list for the municipal council.
In contrast, in the gubernatorial election in Bolívar, the department’s traditional political clans remain firmly in control. Former Conservative representative Yamil Arana has the support of the leading clans in the Conservative and Liberal parties, including the Blel family (of convicted parapolítica Vicente Blel), which currently holds the governorship. He is the favourite but faces nine other candidates, including Yolanda Wong, a former caretaker mayor of Cartagena under disciplinary investigation for contract irregularities.
Cúcuta and Norte de Santander
In 2019, Jairo Yáñez (Greens), an outsider with no prior political experience was unexpectedly elected mayor of Cúcuta. He leaves office with low approval ratings.
The field of 16 candidates to replace him include controversial former mayor César Rojas (2016-2019), who faces 37 criminal investigations in the Fiscalía (charged in two cases), 2019 runner-up Jorge Acevedo and former councillor José Leonardo Jácome, who has the support of most of the department’s strongest machines (in the Liberal, Conservative and La U parties) as well as that of former mayor Ramiro Suárez, who is under house arrest serving a 27 year sentence for homicide. Yáñez is supporting the Green candidate, Sergio Maldonado. The uribista candidate is Juan Carlos García-Herreros, who placed second in the last two gubernatorial elections.
In the governor’s race, former governor William Villamizar is likely to return for a third term (after 2008-2011 and 2016-2019), backed by much of the department’s political machines (his political group has controlled the governorship for four consecutive terms). Villamizar has been implicated in several corruption scandals linked to contract irregularities over his two terms. The uribista candidate is retired Maj. Gen. Jorge Eduardo Mora, another senior commander ‘purged’ from the army last year.
Looking ahead
Lots of things can (and will) change in two months, the decisive moments in the campaign. Candidates will drop out, others will attempt to form last-minute formal and informal alliances and some frontrunners will lose their advantage. Last-minute surges are quite common, as are entirely unexpected victories.
Over the next two months, I hope to write more detailed posts covering the elections in the major cities and departments, and other interesting aspects of these elections. Subscribe now to keep following if you’re interested!