Attack on Miguel Uribe: The ugly face of political violence
Presidential pre-candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay was shot in the head on June 7 and remains in critical condition. The attack has rocked the political world and revived fears of a dark past.
On Saturday June 7, uribista presidential pre-candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay was shot several times, including in the head, during a campaign event. As of the time of writing, he remains in critical condition after undergoing surgery on Saturday night, with doctors reporting signs of neurological improvement. The suspect, a minor (14), was arrested after the shooting.
Daylight shooting
Miguel Uribe Turbay (39), a first-term senator and one of five presidential pre-candidates of the uribista Centro Democrático (CD), was shot while giving a speech at a park in the Modelia neighbourhood of Fontibón in Bogotá, at around 5:30 pm, late Saturday afternoon. It was a small, impromptu, outdoor campaign rally, and he was accompanied by a city councillor and local alderman.
Eight shots were fired and he was shot three times from behind, including twice in the head. He collapsed, bleeding from the head. Uribe was unconscious when he was rushed to a clinic in an ambulance, which miraculously appeared passing by.
A paramedic in the ambulance later said that he two bullet wounds in the skull and another in the left leg, and that he was unconscious but with vital signs. In the evening, he was transferred to Santa Fe Foundation hospital, one of the most advanced and renowned hospitals in Colombia. He underwent surgery on his brain and left thigh on Saturday night. Uribe survived the surgery and was moved to the ICU, but the hospital has said that he remains in ‘very serious’ critical condition with uncertain outlook. On June 9, the hospital said that he has shown little response to the treatments, and that he remains in critical condition. On June 11, the hospital reported signs of neurological improvements from a decrease in cerebral edema. On Instagram, his wife has said that her husband is fighting for his life.
The shooter
The suspect, a 14-year-old young man, attempted to flee the scene on foot, but was quickly caught by police and security, who shot him in the leg after he opened fire on them.
The young man’s mother died when he was young, and his father lives abroad, so he was left in the care of an aunt in Bogotá. Just two weeks ago, he was contacted by the city’s child protection agency, responsible for identifying and supporting at-risk youth, but he refused their help. On social media, Petro has confirmed that he was also enrolled in Jóvenes en Paz, a social program run by the national government, but that he demonstrated a “completely conflicted personality, with no ability to establish intersocial contact” and that he voluntarily dropped out without attending classes. This is the classic profile of the sicario, or hired hitman. The authorities are well aware that he was merely the material author of the crime.
The weapon used was a 9mm Glock firearm, a weapon that’s expensive and difficult to acquire in Colombia. The police has said that the weapon was originally purchased in Arizona in 2020, but it’s unknown when or how it entered Colombia.
When he was caught and restrained on the floor, the young man said “it was the man of the olla, I’ll say who it was, let me give you the numbers”, and also said that he did it for money and his family. The ollas are criminal microtrafficking gang in Bogotá. El Tiempo reports that he may be connected to local gangs operating in the Santa Fe locality of central Bogotá, over 15 km away from where he lives in Engativá (western Bogotá). Now, one of the missing elements is his cellphone: authorities have confirmed that he had a cellphone with him, but that it was lost and wasn’t there when he was apprehended.
The political reactions
The assassination attempt against Uribe Turbay was universally condemned by politicians from all sides as well as foreign leaders. Sadly, the political recriminations, squabbles, shameless opportunism and finger-pointing followed quickly.
The presidency put out an official statement on Saturday night condemning the attack as an attack on democracy and free expression, reiterating the government’s commitment to the protection of all political leaders. In a far more abstruse personal tweet minutes later, expressing solidarity with the Uribe Turbay family, Petro lamented that “they want to kill the son of an Arab woman in Bogotá, whom they had already murdered”, a reference to Miguel Uribe’s mother, Diana Turbay, a journalist (daughter of former president Julio César Turbay Ayala, the son of a Lebanese immigrant) kidnapped by Pablo Escobar’s Medellín Cartel and killed in a botched rescue attempt in 1991.
Petro held an emergency security council that night, with cabinet ministers, military and police leadership, public institutions and Bogotá mayor Carlos Fernando Galán. Petro’s subsequent televised address began well—praying for Miguel Uribe’s life, guaranteeing absolute transparency in the investigation, rejecting any attempts to draw political benefits from the pain, affirming that whatever one’s political thoughts they are first and foremost human beings with an absolute right to live and reiterating that politics must be free from violence. He said that all resources and energy would be dedicated exclusively to finding the masterminds, and admitted that the attack was a failure of the government, the state and the entire nation. But like a lot of Petro speeches, it eventually devolved into another Petro stream of consciousness monologue with scattered ideas and reflections about history, life, greed (the enemy of life), Hegelian dialectics, his personal memories ‘dancing in the mountains’ with Diana Turbay and a bizarre obsession with Uribe Turbay’s Arab ancestry (he concluded his speech by telling Uribe, in Arabic, salaam alaykum). The presidential reaction was erratic, somewhat out of touch with the seriousness of the moment, lacking empathy and dignity.
Many feel that the attack was the result of a tense political climate that incites violence and hatred. Many, particularly on the right, hold Petro directly responsible for fanning the flames in recent months with his increasingly radical and belligerent rhetoric directed against his political opponents. In recent rallies, Petro has dehumanized his opponents (saying that those opposed to his labour reform were not human beings), repeatedly heaped epithets on them (HP esclavistas) and used uncomfortably war-like language and symbolism (brandishing Bolívar’s sword and waving the red and white ‘war to the death’ flag). Marco Rubio, who doesn’t have any lessons to give on this matter, said the attack against Uribe was the result of “violent leftist rhetoric coming from the highest levels of the Colombian government.”
Politicians and presidential candidates expressed concerns about the prospect of a new spiral of violence in Colombia and called for national unity and a de-escalation of the violent and hateful rhetoric in political debate. Pacto senator and pre-candidate María José Pizarro, the daughter of Carlos Pizarro, assassinated during the 1990 campaign, called on her party, the media and influencers to reject messages of revenge, hatred and incitements to violence. David Luna invited everyone to ‘tone down their words’. Foreign minister Laura Sarabia admitted that she, like many others, have failed in peace and security, and called for national unity, eradication of violence and respect for others who think differently. Former president (2010-2018) Juan Manuel Santos said that it’s necessary to temper the language, starting with Petro, who is obligated to set an example.
Those good intentions have, so far, not really been translated into actions—by either the government or (some) of its opponents.
The government was criticized for not cancelling a scheduled concert in downtown Bogotá on Sunday, organized by RTVC (the public broadcaster), and grotesquely spinning that music concert into a ‘message against violence’ or a ‘reflection on Miguel’s recovery’.
Petro has, somewhat irresponsibly, speculated about various hypotheses about the crime, including that it was from ‘enemies of the government and the consulta popular’ and connected it to online threats against his children. He has exposed his hypothesis about an international criminal alliance being behind the attack. In a lengthy tweet, Petro has talked about some ‘narcotrafficking junta’, based out of Dubai, with Albanian cocaine traffickers allied with the Clan del Golfo and alias Mordisco’s FARC dissidents. For Petro, the attack against Uribe is tied to plots to destabilize his government and/or overthrow him, as he has denounced since last year.
Petro has also blamed the political climate on the Senate’s decision to reject his labour reform in March. He has again disingenuously complained that his opponents haven’t heeded his message for peace. The government has been sending mixed messages about its commitment to de-escalating tensions: on the one hand, Petro ultimately signed, on June, the (likely illegal) decree convening the consulta popular by decree despite widespread criticism (an upcoming post will discuss this!); on the other hand, the government has said that Petro is open to meeting with opposition figures and reiterated its commitment to ensuring the safety of all candidates.
The opposition has called for national unity, but hasn’t been eager at taking the first steps themselves. Alleging the absence of guarantees and the government’s incendiary language against the opponents, they’ve refused to recognize the government’s legitimacy in providing fair oversight of the electoral process. Nine parties (CD, CR, Liberals, Conservatives, La U, MIRA, CJL, ASI, Liga) refused to attend a meeting, convened by the government, of the electoral monitoring commission on Monday. CR refused to attend in an ‘act of protest’ while Vicky Dávila refused the ‘poisoned invitation’ calling Petro the instigator responsible for everything that has happened. Instead, they called on the inspector general, Gregorio Eljach, to convene a meeting. On Tuesday, 14 opposition and independent parties met with Eljach of an ‘parallel’ election monitoring commission. The Pacto, the Greens and others who attended the meeting convened by the government weren’t invited. After the meeting, the Conservative president of the Senate, Efraín Cepeda, asked to meet with the military and the police to discuss security guarantees for parties and candidates—seemingly forgetting that, like him or not, the president is the commander in chief.
Both the government and the opposition are in a sad spectacle where both profess their support for ‘national unity’ and ‘lowering the temperature’ but where no one wants to take the first step and act like responsible adults. The right believes that they’re the victims in this case, and that Petro is responsible. Petro, increasingly isolated from the rest of the left, has again showed his unwillingness to tone it down because he believes that the opposition is seditious.
Certain candidates have behaved particularly shamelessly in seeking to exploit the tragedy for personal political gains. Several candidates and politicians have rushed to the hospital where Uribe is hospitalized, ostensibly to offer their ‘thoughts and prayers’ and the like, but really to hold makeshift press conferences with political messages. Vicky Dávila in particular has gone several times (becoming the subject of online mockery for her constant visits), largely for the purpose of holding campaign-style events. In keeping with her old style of sensationalistic reporting and disinformation, she claimed that the attack was ordered by ‘Mordisco’ and is part of a terrorist plot that also includes attacking her and CD pre-candidate María Fernanda Cabal. She later admitted that she had no way of verifying the information. At the other end of the spectrum, left-wing presidential candidate Daniel Quintero, former mayor of Medellín, has claimed—again without evidence—that he heard that the attack was ordered by an alliance between the Clan del Golfo and a far-right group with ties to a foreign country as a plot to destabilize the government and help Vicky’s campaign.
The criminal investigation
A lot remains unknown and under investigation. The media, online sleuths, politicians and commentators want immediate answers, and have rushed to follow various clues and leads, including things that have turned out false. The attorney general, Luz Adriana Camargo, has said that the Fiscalía is reviewing over a thousand videos and has conducted over 20 interviews. They haven’t been specific about their main leads and working theories, but Camargo has said that it is presumed that the shooter was recruited by a criminal network dedicated to contract killings (sicariato).
Attention has also been focused on the candidate’s security detail. On Saturday night, Petro ordered that Uribe’s bodyguards and security detail be investigated. Petro later said that Uribe’s protection detail was ‘strangely reduced’ on the day of the attack from 7 to 3 persons. Uribe had a mixed security detail with four police officers and three bodyguards from the National Protection Unit (UNP), the agency responsible for the security of public figures. The head of the UNP, Augusto Rodríguez, said that because of circumstances ‘typical of the dynamics of the service’ there were fewer people protecting him that day (because of Uribe’s late working hours, his bodyguards took turns to rest). Rodríguez recognized that this number was not enough for a presidential candidate. Miguel Uribe’s lawyer, who has filed charges against Rodríguez, has said that in 2025, his team sent 23 requests to the UNP to strengthen his protection, but all of them were refused. Rodríguez is now facing calls to resign.
The military criminal justice system has opened its own investigation into the “presumed responsibilities” of active members of the police. Petro has said that the police is ‘heavily infiltrated’, again without providing details or evidence to support his claims. Security failures are reminiscent of the attacks against Luis Carlos Galán and Carlos Pizarro in 1989/1990, in which sectors of the state, infiltrated by criminality, were involved.
Return to a dark past?
For many Colombians, the attack against Miguel Uribe revived fears of a return to the barbaric political violence of the 1990s. Politicians, commentators and analysts have repeated over and over again that Colombia cannot return to this painful past or that the country has gone back 30 years.
On June 10, at least seven people were killed and another 28 wounded in a series of 24 terrorist attacks in the Valle (Cali) and Cauca, in southwestern Colombia. The wave of terrorist attacks, largely directed against the police, were perpetrated by Mordisco’s dissidents, which broke off peace talks last spring. Petro has said that the government’s working theory is that these attacks are connected to the attempt against Uribe’s life. Alejandro Eder, the mayor of Cali, said on Twitter “they want to bring us back to 1989. We won’t allow it.”
The attack against Miguel Uribe immediately evoked dark memories of 1989-1990, when three presidential candidates—Luis Carlos Galán, Bernardo Jaramillo and Carlos Pizarro—were murdered. The late 1980s and the 1990s were tremendously cruel, barbaric years of violence in Colombia with drug cartels defying the state, powerful guerrillas disputing national power and savage paramilitary groups acting in cabal with sectors of the state.
This assassination attempt is the most serious attack against a presidential candidate this century, although Petro and Álvaro Uribe both narrowly escaped assassination attempts during the 2018 and 2002 campaigns respectively.
In a country where the media-political narrative is very Bogotá-centric, it’s a shocking event that jolts the país político. The last major politician who was assassinated in the capital was Álvaro Gómez Hurtado in 1995, and the last major attack against a prominent national politician was the FARC’s failed attack against Fernando Londoño, a former Uribe cabinet minister, in 2012. This doesn’t mean that political violence had stopped in the country, but rather that it became concentrated outside the political centre. In fact, according to the MOE’s data, political violence has increased significantly over the past decade. In 2023, there were 749 attacks against political, social or local leaders, compared to 83 in 2014 and 189 in 2015. The 2022 national and 2023 regional elections both saw an increase in political violence compared to the 2018-2019 or 2014-2015 electoral cycles. This violence has been concentrated in peripheral regions, and is in good part connected to the expansion of illegal armed groups across Colombia since the 2016 peace agreement. This new form of violence is much more diffuse and less political than the violence of the 1990s, carried out by a myriad of different illegal actors with differing capabilities and objectives, more criminal modalities (rather than guerrilla warfare or irregular armies), creating a multiplicity of subnational conflicts in different parts of the country. When the violence occurs at a local level, particularly outside the biggest cities, it tends to go unnoticed. An attack against a presidential candidate is obviously a turning point in this violence.
However, despite what some politicians like to say, Colombia hasn’t gone back to the 1990s, at least not yet. The homicide rate in the country was much higher then: in 1991, the homicide rate was 85.9 per 100,000 inhabitants (over 28,000 murders), while in 2024 it was 25.4.
Nevertheless, the attack against Uribe, combined with the terrorist attacks in the southwest and the ongoing war in the Catatumbo, feeds into a fairly widespread perception that Colombia is slipping back into a spiral of uncontrolled violence and terrorism under Petro. Security, one of Petro’s biggest weaknesses from the beginning, will be the main focus of the 2026 elections.