Water trucks, bribes and corrupt deals
A scandal about costly water trucks has become one of the biggest scandals facing the Colombian government, involving bribes and payouts to congressmen. The full story, so far, of this giant scandal.
The Petro administration is embroiled in a serious corruption scandal. What began as a relatively minor scandal about overly expensive water trucks has spun into something much bigger, implicating the highest levels of the executive and legislative branch.
From expensive water trucks…
This scandal began with contracts by the Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (National Unit for Disaster Risk Management, UNGRD), the emergency management agency, for water trucks to deliver water in La Guajira. The trucks were parked and never used. In February, W Radio had revealed massive cost overruns in the contracts to purchase 40 trucks, amounting to 20.2 billion pesos ($5.1 million) in a contract worth 46.8 billion pesos.
Some of the money in these contracts was allegedly handed out to political clans in La Guajira—including 62 billion pesos for ‘heavy machinery’ to the municipality of Uribia, the guajiro stronghold of paisa Conservative senator Carlos Andrés Trujillo. In 2022, Trujillo won over 20,000 votes in La Guajira, 10,000 of them in Uribia.
In March, W Radio’s investigations found suspicious cash operations which could indicate money laundering. Huge amounts of cash (900 million pesos) were deposited at a bank in Pasto (Nariño), the hometown of Luis Eduardo López Rosero, the mysterious pastuso contractor who won the juicy water trucks contract. The company which obtained the contract had no experience in water tank trucks, had assets of just 200 million pesos and was under investigation for cost overruns in contracts during the pandemic.
Olmedo López, the director of the UNGRD, was fired on February 29, just after Petro’s transparency secretary had denounced him to prosecutors for his role in this scandal. López, an inept and inexperienced businessman and politician who’d been appointed thanks to his left-wing credentials and political connections in Antioquia (notably Trujillo), had already been under fire for the UNGRD’s poor handling of the wildfires in January 2024 and for accusations of nepotism and political favouritism, and he had previously been suspended from office for a month by the comptroller’s office in December 2023.
He was replaced by former left-wing Bogotá city councillor Carlos Carrillo. He has no experience in emergency management, but he was appointed by Petro for his promise to root out corruption and ‘purge’ the agency.
… to briefcases full of cash
Sneyder Pinilla, a former mayor of Sabana de Torres (Santander) appointed by López as subdirector for disaster management, managed the acquisition of the 40 trucks. Pinilla is seeking a plea deal with prosecutors and, on April 30, he gave a list of names implicated in the scandal. His list included Olmedo López and two subdirectors, but most explosively the president of the Senate, Iván Name (Green) and the president of the House, Andrés Calle (Liberal), though he provided no evidence to support his accusations.
On May 3, Sneyder Pinilla gave an interview to Semana’s Vicky Dávila—the go-to sensationalistic journalist for any and all big accusations of corruption against the administration—as well as W Radio’s Daniel Coronell. Pinilla said that Olmedo López ordered him to give 3,000 million pesos ($769,000) to Name and 1,000 million pesos ($256,000) to Calle, allegedly to secure their support for Petro’s legislative agenda.
Pinilla claims that he gave the money in cash, in briefcases, directly to Calle and to a messenger sent by Name. The handover took place in October 2023, before the local elections, because there was “eagerness” ahead of the elections. The alleged bride to Calle was delivered in person, at Calle’s apartment in Montería (Córdoba), and Pinilla speculates that the money may have been used to ‘invest’ in the elections. Around this time, Petro’s healthcare reform was in second debate in the House. Anti-petrista journalist and influencer Melquisedec Torres has found chats between Calle and Pinilla discussing the delivery of the money in Montería.
Name, who has clashed with Petro and the administration repeatedly as president of the Senate, denied Pinilla’s claims. Calle, a petrista Liberal, offered his full support to ‘efforts to promptly clarify’ the facts related to the scandal while assuring that he has no relation whatsoever to this contract, vowing to defend his reputation and honour and not tolerate any defamation or injustice against him.
According to Pinilla, Sandra Ortíz, Petro’s presidential advisor for the regions, was Name’s messenger to whom he gave the 3,000 million pesos in Bogotá, over two days. Sandra Ortíz is a former Green representative (2014-2018) and senator from Boyacá (2018-2022) who lost reelection in 2022, but was appointed as presidential advisor for regions in May 2023, as a thank you for supporting Petro’s campaign from the first round in 2022. Ortíz retains significant political influence in her native department, and is now close to governor Carlos Amaya. Ortíz denied the “slanderous claims” and claimed that these accusations sought to divert attention away from those truly involved in the scandal.
Pinilla also says that interior minister Luis Fernando Velasco attended a meeting in September 2023 with Sandra Ortíz and Olmedo López during which the order was given to bribe the presidents of both houses.
Without mentioning names or giving more details, Pinilla also alleged that he has compromising information about 15 other congressmen, part of a strategy of contracts/money in exchange for their votes in Congress. Pinilla has said that he won’t give more information until he receives guarantees and protection from the Fiscalía, claiming that his life is at risk.
W Radio found that Andrés Calle and several congressmen from different parties visited the UNGRD in the weeks before the 2023 elections.
A relative of Conservative senator Carlos Andrés Trujillo also visited Sneyder Pinilla. Trujillo’s name had previously come up in another facet of this scandal, and the Conservative senator certainly is very close to Olmedo López—López had been Trujillo’s environment secretary in Itagüí when Trujillo was mayor in the early 2010s.
Pinilla and Olmedo López also authorized the disbursement of 400 billion pesos to the mayors of Uribia, Sabana de Torres, Girón (Santander) and other municipalities from a fund without oversight. As Carlos Carrillo said, Olmedo López’s “heart was in Uribia”—he was very close to the current mayor, Jaime Buitrago (an ally of Trujillo) and had a close relationship with a local UNGRD official (perhaps even a romantic relationship).
On May 3, La FM radio obtained chat screencaptures from Olmedo López’s lawyer implicating Andrés Idárraga, Petro’s transparency secretary, in potential influence peddling. In November 2023, Idárraga texted asking for the contact info of “the person who manages the incomes” (ingresos) and asking him to meet with the mayor-elect of Barrancabermeja. Later, around the time of López’s suspension in late 2023, Idárraga texted him saying he was “at his service” and that “in this government we must have each others’ backs.”
Denials and anxiety at the top
On May 3, the presidency released an official statement reiterating “zero tolerance against corruption” but not mentioning anything about the scandal at hand. Instead, the administration announced a series of vague measures to fight corruption, including a working group to coordinate efforts against corruption. In a speech at an event that day, Petro said that, while he can’t be a judge, any civil servants with ‘strong indications of corruption’ must leave their jobs. He also tweeted that “nobody is protected here”, “civil servant who comes to steal is a civil servant who leaves.” The president’s office confirmed that this meant that Ortíz and Idárraga would be dismissed.
On May 6, the president announced that Sandra Ortíz’s resignation had been accepted, but that Idárraga would remain in office by mutual agreement. Idárraga claimed that the accusations were retaliation for having reported the scandal to prosecutors in February. The official statement from Petro’s office reiterated the government’s commitment to fight corruption and guaranteed that the authorities responsible would enjoy full autonomy to resolve the cases in a “fair and transparent manner.”
Olmedo sings
Following his subordinate, Olmedo López has started singing, taking to the media to tell his version of events. López says that he was ‘following orders’ and resents being left alone by the government. On May 8, López surprised some by posting a video asking Petro for ‘forgiveness’ for this ‘deplorable scandal’, and heaped praise on the president’s probity and his fight against corruption, signaling that he wouldn’t directly implicate the president.
López’s lawyer teased future revelations, saying that the scandal was ‘Yidispolítica 2.0’, referring to the scandal when Uribe administration officials offered bribes and patronage jobs to representative Yidis Medina in exchange for voting in favour of the constitutional amendment allowing Uribe’s reelection. The scandal also appears similar to the Mensalão scandal in Brazil during Lula’s first term.
López’s version largely corroborates Sneyder Pinilla’s earlier revelations, and he has remained coy and largely vague, keeping several details to himself and being evasive when asked specific details or names.
In an exclusive interview with Vicky Dávila on May 25, López said that he received marching orders from a ‘conclave’—a small number of senior officials, ministers and heads of departments. This ‘conclave’ managed ‘agreements’ with certain congressmen and gave the orders to meet ‘obligations’ with these congressmen. López says that he now regrets it and that he was wrong.
According to earlier reports in Semana, Carlos Ramón González, the current intelligence director and director of the Dapre (the presidential office) at the time of the scandal, allegedly gave the order to buy off congressmen. López has not explicitly confirmed this in public interviews, but hasn’t denied his participation either.
Carlos Ramón González, a former member of the M-19 guerrilla like Petro, is a relatively little-known apparatchik who has long operated outside of the public spotlight. Before joining the government in April 2023, González had held various leadership positions in the Greens for many years, wielding significant influence within the party in spite of his anonymity and, in 2022, he worked to ensure that a good chunk of the party supported Petro and later joined the governing coalition. González is the sort of ‘political entrepreneur’ who operates in the shadows: his family owns a network of companies which have won public contracts, loaned money to the Green party and operate in the healthcare business. His appointment to the Dapre in 2023 was his first time holding public office since the 1990s. As director of the Dapre, González was Petro’s gatekeeper (replacing Laura Sarabia) and managed the infamous computador de palacio, that is, the bureaucratic ‘quotas’ (patronage appointments) given out by the executive to ‘align’ votes in Congress. After Petro’s favourite, Laura Sarabia, returned in force to the president’s inner circle and replaced González, he was appointed director of the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI), the intelligence agency.
Most explosively, López implicated interior minister Luis Fernando Velasco in the scheme, saying that Velasco “will have to explain a lot to the country,” notably “the reasons for an agenda that was carried out and of which I am a witness.”—this agenda being of ‘acts of corruption that benefited a significant number of congressmen.’ Countering Velasco’s claims that López has no evidence, López retorted that he has evidence. López was somewhat less forthcoming when asked about Carlos Ramón González, and said that finance minister Ricardo Bonilla was one of the bosses he had at the time, because the finance ministry approves the allocation of expenses on a monthly basis.
López has been reluctant to give names of congressmen implicated, holding on to them as a bargaining chip with prosecutors, but he has given some names. He said that Conservative representative Wadith Manzur, the president of the lower house’s commission of accusations (which notably investigates all accusations against the president and may bring impeachment charges), ‘sold out’ and benefited from corrupt contracts, receiving infrastructure contracts in his region. López has said that he negotiated with ‘spokespersons’ representing a group of congressmen, and insinuated that opposition congressmen may also have been among the beneficiaries.
The media has also obtained WhatsApp chats between Pinilla and Partido de la U senator Julio Chagüi discussing UNGRD projects in Sahagún (Córdoba) and mentioning the interior minister.
López confirmed Sneyder Pinilla’s accusations against Name, Calle and Ortíz and further added that he was a witness to the whole thing, having been at the meetings and attending to the congressmen and the messenger (Ortíz).
Velasco has repeatedly denied Olmedo López’s accusations, saying that he never gave criminal orders and that the accusations are a smokescreen, referring to López as the “thief of the UNGRD.” Rep. Wadith Manzur has denied ever having any type of relationship with López, saying that he was lying and trying to generate chaos to benefit himself.
Throughout the interview, López assured that he wants to collaborate with prosecutors to tell the truth and that he feels afraid and intimidated. At length, he expresses his regret for having made mistakes along the way and choosing the wrong path. He says that Colombia is held down because votes in Congress are obtained in exchange for handouts, and that votes in Congress have a price.
The tip of the iceberg
What’s been revealed so far may only be the tip of the iceberg. The scandal goes beyond the water trucks scandal. In an interview with Noticias RCN, López said that there are 380 billion pesos ($98.3 million) compromised in corrupt practices, including 180 billion pesos in contracts to benefit congressmen and another 200 billion who he says ‘belonged’ to someone who gave orders (unnamed) and were for the corrupt ‘agenda’. The figure of 380 billion pesos is five times the 70 billion pesos lost in the Centros Poblados scandal, the emblematic corruption scandal of the Duque administration. W Radio suggests that the total costs of ‘corrupt contracts’ may be even higher: adding up all UNGRD contracts or projects with allegations of corruption and improprieties around them, the total is over 1 trillion pesos (nearly $260 million).
Olmedo López has said that there’s a ‘missing link’ in the scandal—the person who really ordered and orchestrated the water trucks contracts. W Radio reported, based on Sneyder Pinilla’s statements to prosecutors, that the ‘missing link’ is Pedro Andrés Rodríguez Melo, a UNGRD advisor close to Camilo Romero, the former governor of Nariño and current ambassador to Argentina. He was the one who brought the name of Luis Eduardo López Rosero, the corrupt pastuso businessman who won the contract, to the UNGRD. According to Semana, in exchange for getting the contract, the deal was that he needed to set aside 15% (7 billion pesos of the 46.8 billion value of the contract) for bribes. Blu Radio reported that Rosero told the Fiscalía that he was required to give 7.2 billion pesos to Sneyder Pinilla
La Silla Vacía explained how, in February 2024, on the day that López was fired, Pinilla quickly authorized an huge 140 billion pesos disbursement to Corpourabá and Corantioquia, two environmental authorities, just two days after the request was received. Conservative senator Carlos Andrés Trujillo and controversial former Liberal senator Julián Bedoya, two key petrista allies in Antioquia, wield power in Corantioquia, and Bedoya has influence in Urabá. On May 4, Petro suspended the transfer of funds to the two environmental authorities.
It’s obvious that the UNGRD, like in previous governments, was used as a money jar where everyone got their share of big contracts without any oversight. What’s been revealed so far, while outrageous, is only just the tip of the iceberg…
The judicial angle
The scandal will be a critical test of attorney general Luz Adriana Camargo’s independence from the government and commitment to fighting corruption. This is a sensitive and very political case which likely carries serious implications and major risks for the government. She’ll certainly face pressure from the government, but will also face pressure, in the opposite direction, from the media and the opposition to quickly produce results. So far, Camargo has been discreet and said little about this case. As explained by La Silla Vacía, she’ll need to make major decisions about the case: choosing the prosecutor in charge of the case and deciding on the ‘principle of opportunity’ (principio de oportunidad, prosecutorial discretion) for Pinilla and López, based on the information that they provide to the Fiscalía.
In mid-May, Camargo replaced the prosecutor in charge of the case with Maria Cristina Patiño, a former circuit judge who only just joined the Fiscalía. She previously was assistant magistrate of Leonidas Bustos, the corrupt fugitive former Supreme Court magistrate implicated in the ‘toga cartel’ judicial corruption scandal. It just so happens that Pinilla’s lawyer is Luis Gustavo Moreno, the corrupt former anti-corruption prosecutor and lead figure in the ‘toga cartel’ who was extradited to the United States. Having served his sentence in the US, he’s back as a lawyer. López’s lawyer is Moreno’s half brother.
A blow to the government
The UNGRD scandal is a severe blow to the government. It hits two key symbols of the ‘government of change’, for a president who is particularly keen on symbolism: the fight against corruption and the commitment to prioritizing the needs and problems of impoverished, peripheral and forgotten regions like La Guajira. In this scandal, money that was supposed to provide water to Wayúu people struggling with prolonged, severe droughts and an ongoing humanitarian crisis was stolen by a mafia of politicians and went to bribe congressmen and irrigate electoral campaigns. In an investigation by Noticias Caracol in Uribia (La Guajira), one of the poorest municipalities in the country, Wayúu inhabitants denounced that during last year’s local elections politicians wanted their votes in exchange for humanitarian aid (like drinking water) via the UNGRD. Exactly the same thing as under previous administrations.
Gustavo Petro accepted responsibility for appointing Olmedo López, but at the same time tried to distance himself from the scandal, saying that what happened was “an illegal transfer of money that was for victims of tragedies towards electoral campaigns opposed to my government.” Petro correctly pointed out that the government didn’t help elect Iván Name as president of the Senate, and later said that Name is a member of the opposition who hasn’t “spared a second in exercising it” (Name’s election to the presidency of the Senate in July 2023, over Angélica Lozano, was a defeat for the government). But this may all be part of an act, for the public gallery, because at times Name has tactically maneuvered in a manner ultimately favourable to the government’s desires.
At the same time, Petro has reacted as he usually does when he feels cornered and attacked: claim it’s all part of a coup strategy against him. Speaking in Ciudad Bolívar (Bogotá) on May 6, Petro said that the “thesis constructed journalistically by the same lady as always” (Vicky Dávila from Semana)—that the president bought off congressmen to vote for his reforms—was false and part of a “coup strategy.” He claimed that his opponents are using ‘two corrupt people’ to build a bigger coup strategy.
Following López’s round of media interviews, Petro tweeted “my government doesn’t buy congressmen.” In that same (very long) tweet, Petro explained that corruption in the UNGRD is structural and the modus operandi was “unfortunately continued in my government by director Olmedo.” He took responsibility for appointing Olmedo López, but said that the former director could never claim that he received orders from the president to buy congressmen. Carlos Carrillo, López’s successor at the UNGRD, appointed with the mission of ‘purging’ the agency of corruption, has repeatedly said that corruption in the UNGRD is longstanding and structural. He has also recently admitted that the UNGRD was ‘used politically’ by all politicians during the 2023 election.
In all his interviews, López has repeated that Petro didn’t give orders or know about the corruption and bribes. However, in a column in Cambio, Yohir Akerman said that, in November 2023, Petro’s office received an email from a petrista activist in Sabana de Torres alerting the president about the danger posed by Sneyder Pinilla and his murky, corrupt past and his political connections. In March 2024, the email got a reply from the UNGRD signed by… Sneyder Pinilla! In his long tweet, Petro said that the palace received the email but ‘unfortunately’ but the staff member gave it a routine response without forwarding it to him.
All this exculpation of Petro seems an awful lot like the time-honoured presidential defence of todo fue a mis espaldas (everything was behind my back)…
This big scandal, and the sentiment that the government ‘bought’ votes for its reforms, is hurting the government’s legislative agenda—most specifically, the pension reform, which is in a race against the clock to be adopted before the end of the month. Opposition parties have said that discussion of the pension reform should be suspended or defeated because of the scandal, saying that it’s illegitimate and ‘loaded with corruption’. Although the pension reform has the majorities to be adopted in its fourth and final debate in the plenary of the House, the opposition may be successful at filibustering it. Adding to difficulties, the president of the House, Andrés Calle, has lost legitimacy and is authority has been badly undermined because of his implication in this scandal.
The implosion of the Greens
The scandal has hit leading figures of the Greens: Iván Name, Carlos Ramón González and Sandra Ortíz.
The Greens, with 8 senators and 15 representatives, are an important junior coalition partner for the government in Congress, but the party is deeply divided with major unresolved internal contradictions. Ideologically, the party is split between a petrista wing and a centrist wing that’s become increasingly critical of the government. This ideological divide is nothing new, but the current political climate has exacerbated it.
Beyond these ideological differences, the Greens face unresolved internal contradictions that date back to the party’s formation in 2009-2010. On the one hand, the party has long been identified with ‘alternative’, anti-corruption, ‘clean government’ and ‘new politics’ ideals (with slogans like ‘public resources are sacred’), going back to the ola verde behind Antanas Mockus in 2010, and a lot of its leading figures campaigned and were elected on that messaging. On the other hand, the Greens include several more traditional ‘machine’ politicians as well as several so-called caciques alternativos (politicians who pose as ‘alternatives’ or ‘progressives’ but end up replicating traditional clientelistic practices). In the end, like most Colombian parties, the Greens have few ethical qualms in giving their endorsement to all kinds of figures, including more controversial or murky politicians. Iván Name, a senator since 2010, is from the influential Name family in Barranquilla (though politically distant from the rest of his family), and has quietly built a small but important political base, with his daughter as a city councillor in Bogotá since 2011 and relatives appointed to several public jobs. Since January, he has a preliminary investigation in the Supreme Court for alleged ties to the Rastrojos criminal gang.
On May 6, Antanas Mockus, the Greens’ elder ‘moral reference’, quit the party, writing in a letter that many sectors of the Greens had not “incorporated the principles that had given rise to the party.” As one of the founding leaders of the modern party in 2010, as a former presidential candidate and former senator who received 550,000 votes in 2018, Mockus’ resignation from the party was a major symbolic blow.
Somewhat opportunistically trying to cloak herself in Mockus’ principled mantle, former Bogotá mayor and likely 2026 presidential candidate Claudia López followed in his footsteps and announced that she was leaving the party too. Claudia López, one of the most prominent figures of the Greens, said she was leaving because the party had been “coopted and controlled by a petrista minority that doesn’t represent or honour the values, practices and principles that I have defended and practiced in my life.” Using mockusiano language, López said that ethical principles are non-negotiable, public resources are sacred and that the Greens had ceased to embody the spirit of the ola verde.
To many, Claudia López’s words ring hollow and sound hypocritical and opportunistic. López and her wife, senator Angélica Lozano, have faced accusations of influence peddling and new allegations of corruption (which they claim is a discredited set-up by their opponents) which belie their anti-corruption discourse. As Semana, which is vehemently anti-Claudia López, has taken great joy in pointing out, the former mayor gladly welcomed Name and his daughter’s support in 2019 (after having criticized him in 2016). After she took a dig at Sergio Fajardo (she was his running mate in 2018), Fajardo criticized her ‘inconsistencies’ over many years, like being with Petro when it was convenient.
López, Lozano and other figures of the centrist wing of the Greens have tried to make the current scandal ideological by decrying that the party has been ‘coopted’ by petrista corruption, which isn’t quite the case. While González has long been close to Petro, his old companion from M-19 days, Iván Name may be an ethically dubious politician but certainly isn’t a petrista and Sandra Ortíz comes from Boyacá (where the Greens, with several strong leaders, have built a stronghold on a mix of ‘alternative’ rhetoric and clientelistic habits). In reality, the scandal has exposed the contradictions of a party that’s carried the flag of transparency and ethical politics all while welcoming a lot of politicians who don’t practice what they preach.
With her eyes set on 2026, Claudia López has a lot to gain, and little to lose, by quitting the Greens. She detaches herself from a weakened, broken and tarnished party, with the scandal providing the golden opportunity to feign outrage at corruption and petrista cooptation of the party.
Other non-petristas in the party—like Lozano, the very right-wing ‘YouTuber senator’ JP Hernández and representatives like Katherine Miranda and Catherine Juvinao—can’t quit the party as easily as López. By law, members of Congress who leave a party (voluntarily) lose their seat, and those who want to run in the next election for another party must give up their seat at least a year before.
Final words
This scandal is still unfolding, and we’ve only seen parts of it. A lot of major questions remain unanswered, and it’s unclear how deep the scandal reaches in Congress or in the top levels of the government.
The scandal may not sway public opinion dramatically, but it adds to the long list of difficulties and problems facing a government that’s already quite fragile. The interior minister, Luis Fernando Velasco, already weakened by the government’s legislative difficulties, is in an even more precarious situation following this scandal.
Stay tuned: this is only just the beginning…