Rethinking the government: the death of the coalition and the new cabinet
Amidst debates over his healthcare reform, Petro shuffled his cabinet and announced that his congressional coalition has "ended" and that a "rethinking of the government" is necessary.
Gustavo Petro’s presidency is at a turning point as his healthcare reform continues to cause headaches.
On the evening of April 25, the seventh commission of the House of Representatives approved, by 10 votes to 8, the government’s ponencia (rapporteur’s report) for the healthcare reform. However, the leaderships of the three traditional parties in the coalition—the Liberals, Conservatives and the Partido de la U—again reiterated their opposition to the reform and demanded that their representatives vote against.
As Petro continues to stubbornly defend his healthcare reform that is likely doomed, his patience seems to have reached a limit. In response to the events of the day, in a series of late-night tweets on April 25, Petro declared that his “invitation to a social pact for change has been rejected”, that the “political coalition […] ended today by decision of some party presidents” and finally that “such a situation leads us to a rethinking of the government.” Petro asked for all of his cabinet ministers’ resignations and announced a major cabinet shuffle on April 26, with seven new ministers.
What happened? What will the cabinet crisis and “rethinking” of the government lead to? What does the end of the coalition mean?
The healthcare reform in dire straits
I discussed Petro’s healthcare reform and all the months-long drama it has created in a post in early April. I invite you to read that post to understand the context.
In late March, a tenuous tentative agreement between the government and the three parties on a compromise text fell apart after the parties discovered that most of their comments and concerns were not included in the government’s new text. Efraín Cepeda, the leader of the Conservative Party, said that he wouldn’t attend any more meetings with the government because they were a waste of time.
Petro decided to go ahead anyway. Late on March 31, the ponencia (rapporteur’s report) in favour of the government’s version of the healthcare reform was presented, co-signed by the Conservative and Partido de la U rapporteurs. The leadership of those two parties, however, made clear that their signatures were not consulted with them and did not represent the party’s positions.
The Liberals, Conservatives and La U had caucus meetings on April 11 to decide their position on the healthcare reform. The Conservatives and the U effectively decided to give Petro one last chance, right after Petro gave in a bit and authorized interior minister Alfonso Prada to negotiate with the parties and review their complaints. The two parties announced that they would present 133 amendments/proposals to the text in commission. The Liberals decided to follow whatever their leader, former president César Gaviria, does. Nevertheless, the Liberal caucus in the House is divided, despite Gaviria’s threats to discipline anyone who goes against his party line. Petrista Atlántico rep. Dolcey Torres, who came out in support of the reform against Gaviria’s orders, told W Radio that 25 of the party’s 33 representatives support the reform.
However, two days later, the government once again seemed to shut the door to a deal with the three parties. Efraín Cepeda complained that only 27% of their proposals were reflected in a new text they got from health minister Carolina Corcho, and warned that if these conditions persisted, his party would vote no. With no agreement, the Liberals announced that they would table their own separate reform.
Once again, health minister Corcho was a major stumbling block to any compromise. She repeatedly refused to concede anything to the parties, and congressmen complained that she was dogmatic and not listening to them.
Petro responded with some classic political blackmail. He asked for the resignation of six vice-ministers who are seen as ‘quotas’ of the three parties in the housing, transportation and ICT ministries (held by Liberal, Conservatives and U ‘quotas’ respectively). He also met with Liberal ‘quotas’ appointed to government agencies in the housing sector, and asked for the resignation of a Conservative appointee in Coljuegos (the lottery agency) close to Cepeda.
The congressional debate on the reform finally began on April 18 in the seventh commission of the House. Before the commission met, there were rumours in the media that a last-minute deal had been reached with the Conservatives and the U. However, the deal fell apart and the two parties, in a joint statement, reaffirmed their opposition to the text. On his way to the United States, Petro buried the possibility of a compromise, tweeting in response that “not all proposals can be accepted because they return us to a world where private interests manage public money.” For good measure, he added to this, in another tweet, “good luck” (buena suerte).
The session on April 18 was adjourned following confusion over what to do with recusals. Debate resumed on April 19, following controversy over the visit of First Lady Verónica Alcocer to Congress on the evening of the 18th, which interior minister Prada called a ‘courtesy visit’ while the opposition saw it as interference by the executive. On April 19, the government won a small victory with the rejection of the opposition’s negative ponencia which proposed to kill the reform entirely.
Dilian Francisca Toro, leader of the Partido de la U, said that she still had hope that the government would ‘reconsider’. Former Vice President Germán Vargas Lleras, the ‘natural’ leader of opposition party Cambio Radical (CR), threatened not to back Toro if she runs for governor of the Valle del Cauca in the fall if she supports the healthcare reform.
Debate resumed on April 25. In the evening, the commission voted 10 to 8 to approve the positive ponencia, opening the way to article-by-article debate. The government could count, with certainty, on the votes of 9 of the commission’s 21 members (the Pacto’s 4, the two Greens, the Comunes and the two victims’ seats representatives), with the three parties (Liberals, Conservatives and the U) holding the balance with their 8 seats. The government won thanks to the subtle and explicit help of the three parties. Two Conservative representatives—Gerardo Yepes (Tolima) and Alexander Quevedo (Guaviare)—and one U representative—Camilo Ávila (Vaupés)—said they would absent themselves. Yepes and Ávila had controversially co-signed the ponencia in late March, all while their parties opposed the reform. Their absences reduced the quorum and majority required to adopt the text to ten, one short of what the government had.
The Liberals, with four representatives, hung in the balance. Over their heads, their leader, César Gaviria, once again threatened disciplinary measures against any member who went against the caucus’ decision. Petro chimed in, saying that it was unfortunate that Liberals were forced to vote a certain way by those “nostalgic for power.” That threat didn’t stop one Liberal representative, María Eugenia Lopera (Antioquia), from being the tenth and decisive vote in favour of the reform. Lopera is an ally of former senator Julián Bedoya, a controversial political boss in Antioquia who has been an important local ally of Petro since early 2022.
Further debate was suspended, however, because of the lack of a quorum.
The reform remains in dire straits and most likely is doomed to fail sooner or later. Yet, Petro is obstinately
The death of the coalition
The Conservatives and the Partido de la U’s leaderships immediately put out statements, targeted at their own caucuses, in which they both reiterated their opposition. Both parties reminded their congressmen that it is their obligation to vote against all articles of the bill.
While the vote in the House was a first victory for the government, Petro was not happy. Late on April 25, he tweeted that his “invitation to a social pact for change has been rejected”, that the “political coalition […] ended today by decision of some party presidents” and finally that “such a situation leads us to a rethinking of the government.” To complete the message, Petro asked for the resignations of his cabinet ministers ahead of a reshuffle. In other words, Petro killed his coalition and announced a major change in his government, expressed by a new cabinet.
As a warning shot, a few hours beforehand, during an event in Zarzal (Valle), Petro said that the government needed to declare itself in emergency, requiring people “whose heart is in favour of humble people and not simply earning a salary.” He raised the idea of an “emergency government” Petro also complained that Congress had not approving two articles in his National Development Plan (PND) that’d allow the government to buy land through special mechanisms. This is not true: the original articles of the PND remain alive and well, but the congressional commissions did not act on additional proposals to these articles supported by the government. These articles were not voted down, there was just no debate on them in part because of poor coordination by the government departments in charge. But Petro used this to attack Congress for failing to approve ‘very simple’ articles.
The healthcare reform remains Petro’s main nightmare with Congress (and his coalition in it), but not the only one. Petro tried, perhaps halfheartedly, to negotiate with his agenda with the party leaderships, but he feels as if that’s only caused him more headaches and that he’s gotten nothing in return—his reforms are bogged down, with the clock ticking. His patience and initial conciliatory attitude has run out, and he’s had enough. On the night of April 25, he flipped out and decided to kill off the coalition and rethink his government.
The coalition was tenuous, and it would have died sooner rather than later. The troubles in the coalition began this year when Petro presented his ambitious socioeconomic reforms, starting with the healthcare reform, which went against the interests and political visions of the three traditional parties. The coalition’s demise became more or less inevitable when Petro obstinately defended his healthcare reform and refused to concede anything important to the three parties.
The terms of the coalition were never clear: this wasn’t a European government coalition, with a coalition agreement detailing the coalition’s common legislative agenda, but rather a Colombian/Latin American congressional coalition built primarily on bureaucratic ‘quotas’ and patronage. The parties wanted the bureaucratic and political concessions and benefits without being committed to the government’s agenda—which, for all its faults, was clear from Petro’s election platform. The government expected that the parties would obediently support their agenda and underestimated the resistance to a flawed and controversial reform.
Political observers gave the coalition only a few more months. In crude terms, Petro dumped them before they could dump him.
Rethinking the government
The other part of Petro’s late-night announcement, rethinking the government, is a bit more cryptic. However, from the cabinet shuffle on April 26 and Petro’s general personality and behaviour, it’s clear that Petro wants a loyal and dedicated team behind him as he shifts towards a more populist, perhaps more radical, style of governance.
The imminent cabinet shuffle led to intense media speculation, a game of ‘cabinetology’ (gabinetología). On April 26, Petro announced seven new ministers. Seven ministers were dismissed: José Antonio Ocampo (finance), Cecilia López (agriculture), Carolina Corcho (health), Alfonso Prada (interior), Guillermo Reyes (transportation), Sandra Urrutia (ICT) and Arturo Luna (science). They were replaced by Ricardo Bonilla (finance), Jhenifer Mojica (agriculture), Guillermo Alfonso Jaramillo (health), Luis Fernando Velasco (interior), William Camargo (transportation), Mauricio Lizcano (ICT) and Yesenia Olaya Requene (science).
The cabinet shuffle shows that Petro wants a loyal and dedicated cabinet, fully committed to his agenda—and not contradicting him or disagreeing with him on it.
The loss of José Antonio Ocampo and Cecilia López are the biggest coups: both were the remaining ‘leaders’ of the liberal-centrist technocrats against the leftists in cabinet, and both had, along with then-education minister Alejandro Gaviria, raised their concerns with the healthcare reform in cabinet discussions in January-February. Ocampo was seen as the moderate voice of reason and financial stability in cabinet, stepping in to put out fires when Petro criticized capitalism and when energy minister Irene Vélez made radical statements about the energy transition. López was seen as a similarly moderate and reasonable experienced figure. Petro had decided against sacking them in February when he fired Gaviria, but they had lost his trust. Petro had also grown increasingly frustrated with López’s slow and steady approach to agrarian reform. Ocampo and López had the age, political and intellectual experience and background to be a counterweight to Petro (and the leftists) and contradict him. There is nobody like that in the new cabinet.
Petro also sent more strong signals to two of the three traditional parties by firing the ministers seen as their ‘quotas’ within cabinet: transport minister Guillermo Reyes, a ‘quota’ of the Conservative Party, and ICT minister Sandra Urrutia, a ‘quota’ of the U. Reyes had already lost whatever worth he still had when his political benefactor, Carlos Andrés Trujillo, was ousted from the Conservative leadership earlier this year. He had also had a bad record in his portfolio, doing a poor job at managing the suspension of Viva Air and Ultra Air’s operations, and he was just facing revelations that he’s frequently travelled on the plane of a big government contractor.
More surprisingly, Petro also sacrificed Corcho. It was surprising given that he had repeatedly taken to her defence when she was criticized, most recently by César Gaviria. But it shows that he can still read the room, and understood that Corcho was an obstacle to the future of his healthcare reform with her stubborn, dogmatic and activist attitude that politicians don’t appreciate. Daniel Coronell on W Radio said that Corcho was surprised and disappointed by her dismissal, while the other six ministers took it well.
Her replacement is much more suited to political negotiations while still being a loyal petrista: Guillermo Alfonso Jaramillo is a doctor and experienced politician. Jaramillo served as Petro’s health secretary and later government secretary in Bogotá, and was one of the petrista pre-candidates for mayor of Bogotá this year. He also has long political career of his own in Tolima, going back to the 1970s—he has served as representative, governor, senator and mayor of Ibagué—and has his political roots in a left-wing faction of the tolimense Liberals.
The reshuffled cabinet has more petrista loyalists. The new finance minister, Ricardo Bonilla, was Petro’s finance secretary in Bogotá for the entire term (a rarity in Petro’s world), and later worked on his campaign and was an adviser during the transition. Bonilla took risks for Petro: like Petro, he was sanctioned by the Bogotá comptroller and Procuraduría for lowering public transit fares in Bogotá, but he was acquitted of these charges in October 2022, clearing the way for him to hold public office again (he was serving as head of Findeter, the regional development bank/lender, upon his appointment). Bonilla is, like Ocampo, a Keynesian (not a radical) with an academic background who managed public finances carefully in the capital, but his views are more in tune with Petro’s economic views.
The new transport minister, William Camargo, who was serving as president of the National Infrastructure Agency (ANI), was director of Bogotá’s urban development agency (IDU) during Petro’s administration, where he structured plans for the underground metro that Petro remains obsessed about.
The new agriculture minister, Jhenifer Mojica, was part of the transition team last year and was director of ethnic affairs in the land restitution unit since last fall. Mojica comes recommended by Daniel Rojas, president of the SAE, the agency managing seized assets.
Those ministers who kept their jobs are primarily Petro loyalists and people that he trusts or respects. Álvaro Leyva, the foreign minister, stays on despite a rather chaotic and unimpressive management of the foreign ministry because he’s close to Petro and a key player in his total peace agenda. Respected by Petro, Iván Velásquez stays at defence, despite his difficulties in imposing his leadership on the armed forces and the defence sector, contradicting rumours that he was on his way out. Irene Vélez, whose time as energy and mines minister has been marked by several controversial statements and a rather poor knowledge of the portfolio, keeps her job because Petro shares her vision on energy issues and he’s an old friend of her father, Hildebrando Vélez.
In the shuffle, Petro also breaks with the santistas (allies of former president Juan Manuel Santos). The most important ex-santista in cabinet was interior minister Alfonso Prada, who was sacked. Prada was worn out by his difficulties in managing the government's legislative agenda and the coalition (in part he because he was often undercut by Petro) and some other controversies. On top of that, however, Petro’s ties with santismo are increasingly strained. Petro has recently become far more critical of the way Santos negotiated the 2016 peace deal with the FARC. On April 25, at a business forum, Santos praised the existing healthcare system, saying that it is one of the best in the world—whereas Petro and Corcho have insisted that it is one of the worst in the world. On Twitter, he repeated his point, tagging Petro and adding that “we can’t destroy what we’ve built.” Petro, who never misses the chance for a Twitter argument, responded with a ranking of healthcare system by The Lancet in which Colombia is ranked 81st. On April 26, in an interview on W Radio, Santos called on Petro to “moderate” himself.
Petro also made changes in his presidential office. Mauricio Lizcano, the caldense politician and former three-term congressman, was removed as secretary-general of the presidency (DAPRE) and instead appointed as the new ICT minister. Lizcano had a rather rocky tenure and had lost Petro’s confidence, and clashed with Petro’s trusted chief of staff, Laura Sarabia. Lizcano’s departure had been more or less confirmed since last week, but he got a nice consolation prize with a ministry.
Lizcano is replaced as secretary-general by Carlos Ramón González, the little-known but powerful co-president of the Greens. González is the ultimate shadowy apparatchik: he last held elected office in the 1990s, but has been successful as a business obtaining public contracts and lending money to his own party. Like Petro, González was in the M-19, and he helped align much of the party behind Petro in 2022. The secretary-general of the presidency traditionally manages the so-called ‘palace computer’—the ‘database’ of bureaucratic concessions, quotas and patronage. González steps in to shore up relations with the Greens, the other big party still left in the coalition, who are due to hold the presidency of the Senate from July.
What’s next?
Although Petro buried the coalition, he knows that he can’t govern without Congress: Colombia’s constitution, checks and balances and strong judicial review makes it quite hard to govern by decree and executive fiat. Instead of negotiating through the party leaderships, he’ll try to negotiate one-on-one, vote-by-vote, with individual congressmen. This is a risky path and there’s no guarantee it will bring more success—and it opens the door wide open to accusations and suspicions of extortion and vote buying.
The shuffle sent a few signals in this direction. The new interior minister—the person in charge of everything ‘politics’—is Luis Fernando Velasco, who had until now been Petro’s regional adviser and caretaker director of the disaster management agency (UNGRD). Velasco is a veteran caucano Liberal politician who served 24 years in Congress (from 1998 to 2022), including four terms in the Senate and one year as president of the Senate (2015-2016). Velasco was one of the most high-profile opponents of César Gaviria within the Liberal Party and joined the Pacto Histórico in 2021. During the 2022 campaign, Velasco attacked César Gaviria for supporting right-wing candidate Fico Gutiérrez and said that he should resign the party leadership if Petro won. Velasco has the political connections in Congress and insider knowledge to help the government negotiate directly with congressmen.
In addition, the shuffle also sent curious winks to the Liberals. While Reyes and Urrutia, the Conservative and U ‘quotas’, were dismissed, Petro kept housing minister Catalina Velasco and justice minister Néstor Osuna, who are both seen as close to the Liberal Party (and the housing ministry as a ‘quota’)—although both are also close to Petro, particularly Catalina Velasco. To a certain extent, Lizcano being placed at the ICT ministry can be a signal to the Partido de la U: although Lizcano and his father now got their own unipersonal shell party just recognized by the CNE, he was in the Partido de la U until a few years ago. The three parties retain, for now, their quotas in various government agencies and departments (and, for now, some vice-ministerial jobs).
Velasco’s appointment as interior minister is a sign that Petro wants to exploit the growing divisions in the Liberal Party and incipient rebellion against Gaviria. Trouble might be brewing in the Liberal Party after Gaviria threatened to punish those who disobeyed his diktat. On April 26, 18 out of 33 Liberal representatives sent him a letter protesting his threats, considering them inappropriate and undemocratic. They point out that the party’s caucus meeting in early April never decided that members should vote one way or another. The signatories included petrista Liberals like Lopera, Andrés Calle, Dolcey Torres and Olga Beatriz González but also a respected progressive-minded liberal like Bogotá rep. Juan Carlos Losada. Losada tweeted that he has serious reservations about the reform, but its discussion cannot be ignored and reduced to the decisions of Gaviria.
In the two other parties, there are also some rumblings against the leadership’s decisions. Conservative representative Alexander Quevedo, one of the two who stepped out during the vote in the commission, said his party’s communiqué surprised him and wants the party to respect their autonomy as congressmen. U representative Julián López asked his party to change their decision. López, a vallecaucano representative and the son of former senator José Ritter López (who supported Petro last year), is (was?) close to Toro’s faction.
Yet, alienating the party leaders is dangerous: they still have lots of control over their party and troops in Congress. Governing without parties, or as a ‘minority government’, is very difficult in Colombia. Álvaro Uribe and most recently Iván Duque tried governing without (or against) the parties and gave up rather quickly.
Petro is frustrated with Congress’ lethargic pace and hostility to some of his big plans. The populist (opponents might say authoritarian/autocrat) in him is yearning to circumvent these institutions and take his case directly to the people, convinced that (in spite of the polls, which he doesn’t trust) they still support him and that his (narrow) 2022 runoff victory was a popular mandate for change. For that reason, Petro has announced that he will be “returning to the balcony”—that is, speaking to a crowd of supporters amassed below from the balcony of the presidential palace—on May 1, labour day. He seems to have forgotten that his previous attempt at mobilizing popular support from the balcony, on February 14, was a huge flop. This time, the major unions will be marching across the country in support of Petro’s reforms, so turnout could be a bit better. Still, Petro is mistaken if he thinks that he can fix his governability problems with speeches from the balcony. The people aren’t the ones who are voting on his reforms.
A lot of people have said that this rethinking is a radicalization and a shift to the left. Perhaps: the centrists in cabinet who were a counterweight to Petro and the leftists are gone, and Petro’s rhetoric is increasingly populistic and anti-establishment, and he wants things to go faster. At the same time, Carolina Corcho, the minister who perhaps was the highest profile ‘radical’ or ‘leftist’ because of her activist intransigence, was also fired and her replacement, while left-wing, is someone more suited to political negotiations.
It’s still too early to say what the “rethinking” of the government will lead to. The new cabinet is more loyal to Petro, more ideologically cohesive. The administration’s governability is severely weakened, particularly if the three parties respond in kind by stepping up their opposition to the government in Congress. Petro is tempted by a populist strategy, going around institutions, but this won’t do him much good and won’t lead to any real results. The government might move in a more radical (leftist) position, abandoning the centrists and liberals who helped Petro win in 2022. In any case, Petro is walking on very unstable grounds—but Petro is not afraid of taking big risks, so he might relish this.
For now, as Petro said last week: buena suerte!