Colombian Politics Digest VIII: The Pan Am Games fiasco
2024 began with the inauguration of new mayors and governors, but also a new batch of scandals, controversies and mishaps, starting with the Pan Am Games fiasco.
Happy New Year! The political year in Colombia has started with the inauguration of new mayors and governors, but also a new batch of controversies, scandals and mishaps—starting with the Pan Am Games fiasco…
The Pan Am Games fiasco
2024 began with bad news for Colombia and the government: on January 3, Panam Sports stripped Barranquilla of its hosting rights for the next Pan American Games in 2027. Panam Sports said that the decision was made after the host city repeatedly failed to comply with its contractual obligations—more specifically, for failing to pay $8 million in sponsorship and broadcasting rights on time.
Repeatedly unable to meet the stipulated payment deadlines, Colombia received a warning in August 2023 and in October they obtained an extension of the deadlines to December 30 and January 30. Colombia failed to meet the first deadline, and was “irrevocably” stripped of its hosting rights.
The news has become an unwelcome international embarrassment for Colombia and brewed a new political scandal. Gustavo Petro, who had hitherto showed very little interest in the Games, has now taken charge of a last-ditch campaign to rescue the 2027 Games, even thought it may be too late.
At the centre of the firestorm is the Ministry of Sports and minister Astrid Rodríguez. In a statement, the ministry said that they had reached an agreement with Neven Ilic, president of Panam Sports, to make the full $8 million payment in January 2024, and that Panam Sports unilaterally decided to terminate the host city contract.
Her story is contradicted by the minutes of the first meeting of the organizing committee in November, revealed by the media. In the document, signed by Rodríguez as president of the organizing committee, the minister—in November—said that her ministry had the $8 million and that they would be paid in December. The parties also agreed that the national government would shoulder 60% of the costs and local governments would be responsible for the remaining 40%.
Petro’s former finance minister, José Antonio Ocampo, said that the required funds were appropriated and included in the 2023 budget and blamed the sports ministry for the gross negligence and ‘monumental mistake’.
The loss of the Games would also be a massive blow to Alex Char, the mayor of Barranquilla (for a third non-consecutive term, until 2027). The 2027 Pan Am Games would have been charismo’s crowning achievement after two decades in power in Barranquilla, a golden opportunity to show off charismo’s so-called barranquillero miracle to the world. In 2018, Char, in his second term, announced that the city would bid for the 2027 Pan Am Games after successfully hosting the 2018 Central American and Caribbean Games. While Petro was initially incommunicado after the decision was announced, Char quickly sought to revive morale by claiming that there was still hope, that he’d spoken to Petro, that the money was available and that Colombia would lobby Panam Sports to reconsider their decision.
Petrismo played a familiar blame game to deflect criticism. They blamed the Duque administration, the former charista mayor of Barranquilla, Jaime Pumarejo, and the former charista governor of Atlántico, Elsa Noguera, for failing to properly budget the funds.
In an interview with Canal 1, Petro’s first sports minister, María Isabel Urrutia (who was fired by Petro in February 2023), falsely claimed that the topic of the Games had never been discussed during the transition in 2022 and said that the Duque administration had not budgeted any money for the Games. Urrutia also said that Petro told her that the Games were very expensive but ordered her to find the money. The president of the Colombian Olympic Committee (COC) also reported that Petro told him that the Games were very expensive.
Politicians from other parties seized the opportunity to attack the government and, more specifically, the sports minister, calling on her to provide explanations and to resign. Barranquillero Conservative senator Efraín Cepeda said that the decision was a massive, embarrassing blow to Colombia’s international image. Liberal senator Mauricio Gómez, also from Atlántico, called on Rodríguez to resign, claiming that she had never requested the funds from the finance ministry despite being aware of the situation since August. CR senator David Luna announced that he’d present a no-confidence motion against Rodríguez and blaming ‘administrative negligence’ by the government for the fiasco. The motion was signed by 32 senators—although it won’t be debated for a while, as Congress is in recess until February 16.
There has also been criticism from within the very ranks of the governing coalition. Atlántico Pacto representative Agmeth Escaf called the loss of the Games “inconceivable, unjustifiable and unforgivable” and criticized the “immeasurable” damage done to Barranquilla because of the national government’s negligence. While Escaf later praised Petro for his efforts to rescue the Games, he has been very critical of Rodríguez, saying that the head of the person responsible should have rolled by now and that she was not up to the job. Escaf, a former telenovela actor, has long been unpopular within the Pacto because of his close ties to Christian Daes, a powerful Barranquilla business magnate and charista favourite. Gustavo Bolívar, the Pacto’s failed mayoral candidate in Bogotá last year, replied to him with the proverb “raise crows and they’ll gouge your eyes out.”
After showing very little interest in the Pan Am Games, amidst the embarrassing fiasco, Petro took charge of a last-ditch campaign to rescue the Games. He started with a letter to Panam Sports, sent on January 5, expressing his willingness to overcome any obstacles and claiming that Colombia is up to the task of organizing the Games. On January 9, Petro organized a meeting with Char, Atlántico governor Eduardo Verano, the COC, sports minister Rodríguez, Laura Sarabia and foreign minister Álvaro Leyva. After the meeting, Petro said that the $8 million were available and ready to be sent. He blamed the ‘bad news’ on the procedures, some of which they were unaware of, non-compliance going back to the last administration and the fears of some officials to transfer funds at the end of the year—or, more bluntly, “out of ignorance we did not comply.”
Petro announced that he would travel to Chile and meet with Neven Ilic, president of Panam Sports, and the Chilean Olympic Committee, as part of a broader regional lobbying effort entrusted to foreign minister Leyva and Colombian ambassadors in the Americas. Santiago (Chile) hosted the Pan Am Games in 2023.
The COC and Char enlisted Luis Alberto Moreno, a member of the IOC and former president of the Inter-American Development Bank, a seasoned diplomat and politician, to lead parallel efforts to save the Games. He accepted, calling on the government to present an action play with key investment milestones to demonstrate Colombia’s firm commitment to the Games and recover lost trust and credibility—and for “more management, less politics.”
However, it could all be too late. Several other cities are now vying to host the Games instead. The president of the COC complained that Asunción (Paraguay) had been undermining Barranquilla since August and that they pressured Panam Sports into stripping Barranquilla of its hosting rights. Paraguay has since officialized Asunción’s candidacy. Lima has also officially announced a bid. In Mexico, both Guadalajara and Monterrey have publicly shown interest. São Paulo (Brazil), which was bidding for the 2031 Games, could be interested in hosting earlier. With several other cities interested and Colombia’s credibility in tatters, Panam Sports may well prefer to look for a more trustworthy host nation.
If confirmed, the loss of the 2027 Pan Am Games would be a brutal blow to Colombian sports, as has been argued by Colombian athletes, and add to Colombia’s difficulties at hosting major international sporting events. Colombia hosted the 1971 Pan Am Games in Cali, some regional events (2010 South American Games, Bolivarian Games etc.) and lesser international events (2013 World Games), as well as football competitions like the 2001 Copa América and the 2011 FIFA U-20 World Cup. Colombia was set to host the 1986 FIFA World Cup, but withdrew in 1982 because of the costs and requirements attached. Colombia and Argentina were to be co-hosts of the 2021 Copa América, but Colombia was removed as co-host in May 2021 because of the protests that spring (Argentina was also later removed as co-host because of Covid, and the event was held in Brazil).
Politically, the Pan Am Games fiasco has been a terrible start to 2024 for Petro. The government’s inability to pay the $8 million, when the money was there, is a massive screw-up of their own making and stands as a symbol of the government’s difficulties at spending its budget and, in general, its ineptness at managing the regular business of the state.
In the immediate, sports minister Astrid Rodríguez’s days are counted. Petro has not come to her defence publicly, and has no interest in saving her. She will eventually be forced to resign, sooner rather than later, before Congress has a chance to adopt the motion of no-confidence (which has good chances of passing if she doesn’t resign beforehand). The media has reported that she’s already submitted her letter of resignation but Petro hasn’t accepted it yet.
The debacle also raises questions about the Ministry of Sports, one of Colombia’s youngest government ministries, created in 2019 by ‘upgrading’ an agency (Coldeportes) to a cabinet-rank position. At the time, the creation of the ministry was supposed to strengthen sports in Colombia and increase government support for sports and athletes. However, sports in Colombia have long been plagued by political mismanagement and sports agencies have historically been ‘bureaucratic fortresses’ controlled by politicians and used for personal political gains.
New mayors, new governors
Colombia’s new mayors and governors, elected in October, took office on January 1. To name the most important ones: Carlos Fernando Galán in Bogotá, Federico ‘Fico’ Gutiérrez in Medellín, Alejandro Éder in Cali, Alex Char in Barranquilla, Andrés Julián Rendón in Antioquia, Dilian Francisca Toro in Valle and Eduardo Verano in Atlántico. The first months of these new leaders will set the tone for their administrations, and they’ll also define the sort of relations they’ll have with the Petro government.
In Bogotá, Carlos Fernando Galán, has kept the conciliatory, non-confrontational tone from his campaign. In his inaugural address, he promised to work for everyone, including those who didn’t vote for him, govern without a ‘rearview mirror’ (and to end the battle of egos) and reiterated his vow to ‘build on what has been built’ (construir sobre lo construido)—move forward on the many infrastructure projects currently under construction, starting with the first line of the metro. In addition, he cited security and hunger as two of his other top priorities. He said that the national government would find in him an ally to make Bogotá’s big projects move forward. He invited the government to work together on what unites them.
While Galán appears to be conciliatory towards Petro and in no mood to continue the fights his predecessor, Claudia López, had with Petro in 2023, Petro doesn’t seem quite as keen to bury the hatchet. Petro reacted to Galán’s speech, tweeting that construir sobre lo construido means building more TransMilenio (Bogotá’s BRT network), which the left despises. Petro finally met Galán for the first time after the election in December, in Dubai. They met formally on January 10. The two will need to deal with several major infrastructure projects, like the metro, which are under construction or facing obstacles, and which had been the source of tensions between the president and Claudia López.
Galán’s cabinet is largely made up of his inner circle and technocrats (who have worked under different local and/or national administrations), with few politicians. In the city council, Galán starts off with a comfortable majority, made up of his Nuevo Liberalismo as well as the Greens, Liberals, CR, Centro Democrático (CD), La U and the Christian parties—over 30 out of 45 seats. The new council began amidst controversy, when councillors elected Rolando González (CR) as first vice president of the council, a role reserved to the opposition under the opposition statute. As CR is not in opposition, the role should have gone to the Pacto (the only group declared in opposition, along with Juan Daniel Oviedo, the runner-up in the mayoral election), and it was quite widely decried an illegal dirty trick (jugadita). While Galán’s reaction was initially timid (calling, vaguely, to respect the opposition’s rights), amidst the uproar, he took a more forceful stance and explicitly called for the first vice presidency to be held by an opposition councillor. On January 15, González resigned his vice presidency.
In Medellín and Antioquia, Fico Gutiérrez (the right’s 2022 presidential candidate) and uribista Andrés Julián Rendón were sworn in as mayor and governor, respectively. Under their new right-wing leaders, Antioquia and its capital are set to become the main regional base of the opposition to Petro.
Relations between Petro and Antioquia/Medellín have been tense, because of a series of controversial decisions by the national government which have been read as political retribution against a conservative stronghold. The most recent is the withdrawal of devolved powers over mining to Antioquia, a move which Rendón denounced as ‘suffocating centralism’. In his inaugural address, Fico called on Petro not to punish Medellín and Antioquia for “representing ideals different from yours” and to look at Antioquia “with affection and not with disdain, as you have been doing.” Petro, naturally, tweeted back that the word ‘punishment’ does not exist in a “progressive and democratic mind.” Fico also called on the president to “straighten to path” to put himself “on the right side of history”, and criticized Petro’s total peace policy. Fico’s new best friend, governor Andrés Julián Rendón, gave a combative inaugural address in which he said “if Antioquia resists, Colombia is saved” and talked about his proposal to hold a referendum on local governments’ fiscal autonomy.
Fico’s priorities include hunger and childhood malnutrition, bilingual education, education, beautifying the city and ‘rescuing’ EPM (the city’s publicly-owned utilities company). As during the campaign, Fico has continued taking aim at his predecessor (now 2026 presidential candidate) Daniel Quintero, whose term was marred by controversies, scandals and political polarization. But above all, Fico’s return to office also means the return of his patented bombastic, theatrical hardline security strategy. In the first days of his term, following an armed robbery gone viral, Fico put on his sheriff uniform and personally took charge of the police operation to track down and identify those criminals responsible—all relayed via Twitter.
Fico’s cabinet is made up of people who worked in his first administration, uribistas and right-leaning technocrats and people who worked in the private sector. In the council, Fico also starts with a very big majority (at least 15 out of 21 seats) with his own Creemos, uribismo (CD), the Conservatives and the ASI. Like in Bogotá, the left-wing opposition (3 seats) denounced a jugadita against them, as they were denied a vice presidency.
In Cali, Alejandro Eder focused on peace and reconciliation but also complained about the difficult financial situation left behind by his predecessor, Jorge Iván Ospina (who faces several investigations and charges for corruption and irregularities). While Eder wants friendly relations with the government (and interior minister Luis Fernando Velasco attended his swearing-in), he is supported by many right-wingers in opposition to Petro who are thirsty for revenge after Ospina’s bad administration and the wounds left by the 2021 protests in Cali.
Eder’s catchphrase ‘restoring order’ and authority in a chaotic city plagued with a consistently high homicide rate, years of misgovernment, persistent financial difficulties, high distrust in public institutions, and still reeling from the effects of the 2021 protests which traumatized and deeply divided the city. To kick off his term, he’s led a campaign to clean up and beautify parts of Cali, in an early effort to restore civic pride. He also promises a hardline stance against criminality.
Most of his cabinet secretaries are technocrats (including many caleños who had worked in Bogotá) or from the private sector. Eder, who is from one of the region’s wealthiest families, enjoys close ties with the city’s traditional business elites. Politically, while Eder doesn’t enjoy a solid majority on the city council, he shouldn’t face much difficulty there. Eder has established a friendly working relationship with Dilian Francisca Toro, who is back as governor of the Valle for a second term. Toro’s Partido de la U is the largest party on the city council, with 4 out of 21 seats, and key to Eder’s governability. Although Toro and Eder were on opposite sides during the election, they’ve forged a close alliance (for now).
In Barranquilla, Alex Char’s third inauguration as mayor marks the continuation of charista hegemony for a fifth consecutive term (since 2007). Char began his new term promising to fight criminality and big investments in housing, as well as more megaobras (big infrastructure projects) that have been the symbols of charista administrations—his latest one is a big malecón (promenade/linear park) in the low-income southeast of the city. However, the city is deeply indebted and its growing financial difficulties have started raising questions about the long-term sustainability of the charista model and its so-called milagro barranquillero.
For the first time, the Char family is in opposition to the president and doesn’t enjoy close ties to the national government. However, Char is a pragmatic and conflict-averse politician who rarely opines on national politics. He’s offered to work with Petro on projects like offshore wind energy, and, as discussed above, has appeared to work well with Petro on efforts to rescue the 2027 Pan Am Games.
Char’s cabinet is almost quasi-exclusively made up of loyalists who’ve worked with him in the past. The city council has never been a counterweight to charismo and it’s no different this time: led by CR, the charista coalition has all but two out of the 21 seats. Alex Char also has an old ally as governor of Atlántico: Eduardo Verano, a Liberal who (like in 2015) owes his victory to Char’s support, and has repaid the favour by giving charismo six ‘quotas’ in his cabinet and vowing to support Alex’s agenda.
In Cartagena, Dumek Turbay made the news by asking for an ‘exorcism’ for his office, claiming that his predecessor (and arch-nemesis), the foul-mouthed William Dau, was a malevolent and diabolical being. Dumek Turbay, a former governor of Bolívar, was elected thanks to promises to finally build big public infrastructure projects, wants to get off to a strong start with big flashy announcements and security measures (of doubtful effectiveness).
The first lady’s expensive entourage
An article published by La Silla Vacía revealed the exorbitant costs of First Lady Verónica Alcocer’s personal entourage, paid for by the state. Her personal entourage includes a personal stylist, an official photographer, a personal advisor and her best friend, all paid high salaries by three different public entities.
Her personal stylist, officially hired as a subcontractor of RTVC (the public broadcaster), regularly travels with her and earned over $30,600 in 2023 and received $13,000 in travel expenses. Her best friend, hired by the presidential office (Dapre) to support the presidency’s protocol and logistics, largely acts as Alcocer’s ‘lady’s companion’ and earns about $5,300 a month. Alcocer’s personal advisor is hired with the rank of a manager by ProColombia (the investment and export promotion agency) and earns over $7,000 a month, more than a cabinet minister, and often accompanies the first lady in addition to her regular job. The first lady’s official photographer also earns about $5,000, more than the head of the presidency’s communications and press office. These salaries are very high for Colombia: the statistical agency defines the upper class—3% of the population—as those with monthly incomes over ~$1,000 a month (4.2 million pesos).
Like in most countries, the first lady has no official legal status or duties and receives no salary or budget but may be assigned special roles and unofficially takes responsibilities for certain issues—Alcocer has managed the new presidential office for national reconciliation, while her predecessor, María Juliana Ruíz (Duque’s wife) took charge of childhood issues. Controversies over the first lady’s role, activities and spending habits are nothing new. In opposition, petrismo often criticized María Juliana Ruíz’s activities and spending. However, Verónica Alcocer has been an even more visible, politically influential and ambitious first lady than her recent predecessors. She has travelled extensively domestically and internationally, and carefully promoted her image on social media. She has influenced the appointment of close friends and allies to senior positions in government—for example, her high school friend, Ligia Margarita Quessep Bitar (from a political clan in Alcocer’s native Sucre) was appointed ambassador to Italy. Controversially, she was officially designated (and paid for travel expenses) to represent Petro at several important international events—the funeral of Queen Elizabeth II in London, Shinzo Abe’s state funeral in Tokyo and the coronation of King Charles III. Alcocer appeared at her husband’s side during pro-government rallies and marches in 2023.
The very high costs of Alcocer’s entourage undermines the government’s narrative preaching austerity in public office and emphasizing its ‘popular’ roots. Criticism has come from the right-wing opposition, but also from the likes of Green rep. Cathy Juvinao, who drew comparisons to Marie Antoinette.
Two days later, the presidency responded through a statement. It states that Alcocer, as first lady, fulfills a ‘social role’ and that some sections of the presidential office provide ‘administrative support’ to the president’s family and hires a communications team to manage and promote the president’s family’s activities. The statement claims that all four members of her entourage mentioned in La Silla’s article do not exclusively provide services to the first lady and have other responsibilities—something which was never really in doubt. The statement is mum about their remuneration and, as La Silla Vacía detailed, often contradicts previous statements and leaves many questions unanswered.
This latest controversy has again revived the debate over the ‘office’ of first lady in Colombia, a debate which has also happened in other Latin American countries, like Mexico and Chile. Some feel that the role of first lady is outdated and should be abolished (even though it is hard to abolish something that doesn’t legally exist). Pacto rep. David Racero said that he considers first ladies to be an “anti-republican inheritance” and that titles in a democracy are an obsolete legacy when they are tied to a person and not an office. However, he criticized those who didn’t say anything about previous first ladies but who are now suddenly very concerned about the current one.
In other news
On January 12, Petro met with business leaders from the Grupo Empresarial Antioqueño (GEA, the keiretsu of Antioquia’s traditional business elites) and the Gilinski family (bankers and owner of right-wing Semana magazine). They had been the two main business groups absent from Petro’s earlier meeting with the country’s dozen or so leading business magnates in November. Petro announced it as part of his ‘national agreement’. He also took credit for resolving the old business conflict between the GEA and the Gilinski family—the two warring sides had reached an agreement last May, with the Gilinski group taking control of Nutresa but exiting from Sura and Argos (for an interesting read on the future of the GEA, see La Silla Vacía’s article from Jan. 16). The finance minister announced that both business groups had committed to invest in projects in the ‘forgotten regions’ of the country.
A landslide on the Medellín-Quibdó road killed over 35 people. The treacherous road, still unfinished and unpaved in parts, often ranks as one of Colombia’s deadliest roads because of the geological and topographical conditions. The government declared a disaster and Petro announced investments of over $127 million to finish the road—but all past governments had already invested millions in the road. The road is one of only two roads connecting the Pacific coast department of Chocó, one of the poorest departments (over 80% Afro-Colombian), with the rest of the country (the other road is hardly safer). Airlines increased the number of flights, but local residents, as well as Petro and Chocó’s governor, criticized them for taking advantage of the disaster to increase prices. An op-ed in El País argues that the landslide reveals Colombia’s structural racism.
Petro attended the WEF in Davos and later met with Pope Francis in Rome. Petro’s trip to Davos landed the government in hot water again, this time over the costs of a ‘Casa Colombia’ in Davos to promote tourism and foreign investment. The contract for the ‘house’ and activities, for five days, was about 1 million CHF ($1.2 million), including about $188,000 to rent the house as well as $36,800 to rent and decorate a Jeep and $12,800 for a translator. The opposition has criticized the costs as excessive and wasteful spending, while the government has pointed to the high cost of rent in Davos and that other countries rent out similar promotional venues during the WEF.
Hollman Morris, the deputy manager of RTVC (public broadcaster), faces another scandal. The veteran petrista loyalist, accused of conjugal violence and sexual harassment by four women in 2019 (the case was closed for lack of evidence in 2023), now faces accusations of workplace harassment from directors of two public TV channels. He’s accused of having created an abusive, hostile and aggressive workplace environment. Morris has received the public support of Pacto congresswomen and still has Petro’s trust—despite the accusations, he accompanied Petro to Davos.
The government extended for another six months the bilateral ceasefire with the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissident group, until July 16. The third cycle of peace talks with the EMC ended on January 17, with a lengthy agreement including the ceasefire and a reiteration of the EMC’s commitment to stop extortive kidnappings.
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